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AUTHORIZING INSTITUTIONS OF HERITAGE

Chapter 1 established the existence of the Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD). It is the task of this chapter to examine how the AHD is institutionalized and embedded within some of the primary documents and processes of heritage, management and conservation. The conventions and charters enacted by UNESCO and ICOMOS may be understood as authorizing institutions of heritage, as they define what heritage is, how and why it is significant, and how it should be managed and used. This authority comes in part from the influence these organizations have within the policy process at both national and international levels. However, it also derives from the persuasive power of the AHD, which frames the charters and conventions that influence national and international heritage conservation and preservation policies and practices. In turn, the AHD, and the assumptions, values and ideologies embedded within this discourse, is itself reinforced and perpetuated through the policy and technical processes that are driven or underlined by the various charters and conventions.

The argument to be advanced in this chapter develops three interrelated central points. The first is that the AHD, in privileging the innate aesthetic and scientific value and physicality of heritage, masks the real cultural and political work that the heritage process does. Chapter 2 attempted to identify and define this 'work' by arguing that heritage is most usefully perceived as a cultural process about meaning making – it is a discourse that individuals, groups, communities, nations and a range of institutions use to create and define identity and social and cultural meaning in and about the present. The past, it was argued, is drawn on in this process to give explanatory weight to the experiences of the present, but heritage itself is the moment of experience, remembering and meaning making that may occur at physical places. The places of heritage may give added meaning and authority to the act of heritage – but the idea or substance of 'heritage' is not itself innately embedded in a physical relic or place. In sum, then, the cultural and political work or consequence of heritage is to negotiate and define cultural and social meaning in the present. However, the very masking of this process by the AHD has its own consequences. One of these relates to the second point

developed in this chapter, which is to acknowledge that the technical process of management and conservation established and framed by the AHD is itself a cultural process that creates value and meaning. Heritage management, conservation, preservation and restoration are not just objective technical procedures, they are themselves part of the subjective heritage performance in which meaning is re/created and maintained. The meanings subsequently created speak to the cultural and social needs of the present, but these meanings will be linked to the past so that they in turn are given authority and validity. Some of the central values re/created and rehearsed in this process relate to narratives of nation, national identity and the social and historical identities of Western elites.

The third point to be developed is that the heritage management and conservation process is not only about the management of fabric. Rather, it engages in the regulation or 'management' of cultural and social value and meaning. Not only are certain values embedded in the AHD perpetuated, but dissonance is itself regulated and arbitrated by the values and ideologies embedded in the AHD. This is once again obscured by the AHD, which draws our attention continually to the tangible and material fabric of heritage places. These three points are developed in the context of exploring the way the AHD is promulgated within some of the key heritage conventions and charters, and the consequence this has for authorizing certain values and definitions of 'heritage'.

Venice Charter

The non-governmental organization ICOMOS, based in Paris, is an international network of heritage and conservation practitioners and specialists concerned with the protection and conservation of historically important sites and places. It is, at both national and international levels, a highly successful and powerful lobby group, which influences the development of management and conservation polices and legal frameworks in many countries. One of the primary avenues of this influence is through the adoption of national and international charters, which act to guide and inform the conduct of its members – many of whom are employed within a range of governmental and non-governmental heritage organizations, or who work as heritage consultants or academics. The charters themselves may be viewed partly as lobby documents, and are used by national and local governments to inform policy and practice. The lobbying power of ICOMOS in part lies in its international scope, while the international committee is also supported by national chapters across the world. Its members are drawn from a range of professions who deal with conservation, preservation and management issues, and as such the weight of expertise represented by ICOMOS carries considerable political legitimacy.

Prior to the inception of ICOMOS, the First International Congress of

Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments, under the patronage of the League of Nations, adopted the Athens Charter in 1931. This charter established international awareness about conservation issues, laid down a guideline to frame conservation philosophy and practice, and helped to influence the development of Western national practices and legislation. The Athens Charter was reassessed at the Second International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments in 1964, which thereby produced the *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*, otherwise knows as the Venice Charter. An international committee comprised largely of Europeans, but also of representatives from Mexico, Peru and Tunisia, drafted this charter, and ICOMOS was created shortly after in 1965 to support and propagate it (Grieve 2005). Subsequently, this charter has become one of the primary and foundational texts of conservation philosophy and practice (Starn 2002).

The charters and conventions that frame conservation and heritage management are a product of *modernity*, and the expertise that underlines and underwrites these chapters is highly significant in the authorization of these documents. The ability of intellectuals and professionals to make binding statements and pronouncements of authority is well documented in Western contexts (Bauman 1987). This authority, however, is both reproduced in, and is continually reproduced through, the enactment and use of the charters – so much so that the authority of expertise, and subsequently the principles they espouse, become so naturalized as to be understood as 'common sense' or 'good sense'. The Venice Charter establishes and defines the nature of historic monuments and provides guiding principles on how they should be cared for and managed. These principles are based on, as one commentator notes, 'enormous scholarly good sense' (Grieve 2005).

The narratives of *nationhood* interwoven in the AHD drive the very definition of 'heritage' offered by the Venice Charter. In defining the subject of conservation and management, the Charter states that:

> The concept of an historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilisation, a significant development or an historic event. This applies not only to great works of art but also to more modest works of the past which have acquired cultural significance with the passing of time.
>
> (Article 1)

The use of the term 'civilization' is interesting here. In post-Enlightenment Western Europe, the developing nations saw themselves as having reached a pinnacle of cultural evolutionary achievement – a perception that both underwrote the development of national sentiments and underpinned a range of colonial and imperial projects. As Waterton (2005a) argues, it was in this

intellectual context that Ruskin's and Morris's philosophies on authenticity, aesthetics and the sense of inherent value of monuments and buildings arose. The 'conserve as found' ethos is embedded with the idea of immutable inherent value, while the sense of monumentality and aesthetics speaks to the achievements of the 'highly civilized nation' (Waterton 2005a: 313). In the structuring of this definition, the cultural value of great works of architecture and art are taken for granted. Their value is constructed here as part of what Fairclough identifies as the 'common ground' of shared or taken for granted meanings that underpin a sense of fellowship – in this case, a professional fellowship of concern over the preservation and conservation of the past (2003: 55). The first sentence of this definition both expresses the existential assumptions about the nature of 'heritage' and also shapes and defines the common ground of conservation philosophy by reproducing those assumptions as authoritative text. Existential assumptions – assumptions about what exist – are one of the discursive devices that both mark and shape 'common ground' principles and beliefs (Fairclough 2003: 56). In the first sentence of Article 1, items from a 'civilized' context are defined as inherently valuable – in as much by what is said as by what is not said. There is no attempt to explain and justify – monuments from grand backgrounds are valuable, full stop. This is visible in the semantic relations of the text, the 'not only' applied to 'great works of art' implies that we already know these things are valuable and important – an evaluation is here being put across as a statement of fact because they are assured values. However, a concession is made to 'more modest works' which may *acquire* significance, not through innate value necessarily, but once they become old enough. The value judgement of what constitutes 'modest' is not explained – it is known by the writers and readers of this document. Further, the value of 'modest works' is assumed to lie in their status as antiquarian curiosity rather than because they may represent an historical or significant event. Subsequently, those monuments or sites from grand Western contexts are perceived to be inherently valuable, while those things from more modest contexts, presumably non-Western cultural contexts or less grand Western social contexts can, in certain circumstances, acquire or be acknowledged as valuable. Here, the narrative of Western *nationalism* that underpins the AHD is given expression. Moreover, colonial and imperial perspectives are also given voice and credence in this document. As will be illustrated below, this legacy continues to have consequences for the enactment of, and practices guided by, the World Heritage Convention.

The idea of the inherent nature of the value and significance of a monument identified in Chapter 1 as a feature of the AHD is rehearsed throughout the Venice Charter. Not only are monuments 'imbued with a message from the past' (preamble), but a monument is also 'inseparable from the history to which it bears witness and from the setting in which it occurs' (Article 7). Monuments are thus also 'living witnesses of their age-old traditions'

(preamble). The idea here that a monument is a 'witness' to history and tradition anthropomorphizes material culture and creates a sense that memory is somehow locked within or embedded in the fabric of the monument or site. The anthropomorphizing of monuments and buildings is a common form of legitimization in the conservation movement, and is a discursive device that helps naturalize the authority of the values and meanings a place may represent by helping to cement them as inherent (one of the consequences of this will be discussed in Chapter 4). A sense of place is also inherently fixed within the fabric; for instance, in Article 7 a 'sense of place' is made inherent within the fabric of the monument when it becomes 'inseparable' from its setting. The idea of the inherent value of the fabric of a monument is embedded in the guidance the Charter gives to conservation and restoration processes. Article 5 notes that monuments should be used for 'socially useful' purposes, but that any use 'must not change the lay-out or decoration of the building'. This is not because 'unity of style' is to be preserved (Article 11), but because the 'intention of conserving and restoring monuments is to safeguard them no less as works of art than as historical evidence' (Article 3). These statements reveal the existential assumption about the inherent value of a monument that underlies the heritage management process. The idea of 'safeguarding' and the phrase 'no less' trigger the assumptions that 'works of art' and 'historical evidence' are the values most desired about monuments, and that it is their aesthetic and historic qualities that are fundamentally important. The Charter makes these value assumptions appear as unquestioned 'common sense' and as such, the Charter is doing important ideological work in legitimizing and universalizing these values.

The authority and 'common sense' of these values, and their inherent immutable nature, is continually legitimized throughout the Charter by appeals to morality. In Critical Discourse Analysis, a number of strategies have been identified that are used to legitimize the ideology underlying the discourse (van Leeuwen 1999; Fairclough 2003). One of these strategies is to make a moral appeal about what 'must' be done; however, this may also take the form of a narrative cautionary or morality tale (Fairclough 2003: 99). Both of these devices are used in this charter. While the Charter does not construct a clear morality tale in a traditional sense, it makes allusions to and special moral pleas to a sense of duty and morality. Article 15 notes that care must 'be taken to facilitate the understanding of the monument and to *reveal it without ever distorting its meaning*' (my emphasis). The wording of this statement is very strong, demanding total commitment to the values underlying it. It is the work of experts, and the Charter is very stern in its assertion that professional experts are those best suited to care for and protect monuments and sites, that must reveal and expose the meaning of the monument in an objective manner so that its meaning is not distorted. This 'exposure' must be done carefully, not only to avoid 'distortion', but also because

'monuments must be the object of special care in order to safeguard their integrity and ensure that they are cleared and presented in a seemly manner' (Article 14). 'Must' linked to the idea of 'special care' (experts) is not only illustrative of a strong or total commitment to the idea of experts, but more importantly this is played out along side it in order to safeguard 'integrity' (value assumptions) – as to not employ the special care of experts is to compromise the integrity of monuments. Like a Victorian middle class woman, their virtue must be the subject of special treatment and care, so that the artistic or historic evidence is not falsified and their cultural 'virtue' not challenged or altered. The aim is to 'preserve' the aesthetic and historic value (Article 9), but this preservation is 'based on respect for original material and authentic documents'. Here again, value is assumed as being innate to the fabric of the monument, but the use of the word 'respect' is important. A moral appeal is made with this term and it is suggested that only those with such a 'respect' have the ability to care for monuments and their values in a 'seemly' way. It is also a call for respect for the aesthetic and historic values inherent in fabric that experts also have a duty of care to 'safeguard' (Article 3). Throughout the Charter there is an appeal to a sense of fellowship based on an appeal to respect the legitimacy of certain values and meanings and to make these values and meanings universal. The preamble notes that, 'people are becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and regard ancient monuments as a common heritage'. Thus, it becomes the duty of those upholding the Charter to ensure these universal values are revealed, understood and propagated as consensual history and heritage: 'It is our duty,' the preamble continues, 'to hand them on [to future generations] in the full richness of their authenticity'.

This charter establishes and reinforces a sense of the innate aesthetic and historic values of the grand and 'good'. It further maintains that experts must ensure that these values are not altered and distorted, but rather are safeguarded in the way that monuments are protected and maintained. What emerges here is one of the key underlying principles of heritage management and conservation, which is that the value or significance of a site or place should determine how that site or place is conserved and managed (Kerr 1990; Pearson and Sullivan 1995; King 2000; Mathers et al. 2005).

The Venice Charter is, as noted above, one of the foundational texts for the conservation and preservation movements that developed in the 1960s. It also underlines and gives a philosophical basis for the technical processes of heritage management that began to emerge in many Western countries as a formal legal and policy process during the 1960s and 1970s. The Charter, and the processes of conservation, restoration and management that it underpins, is a document that is shaped by the AHD and continually reinforces and authorizes that discourse, by its very nature as a canonical text actively supported and propagated by ICOMOS. One of the more subtle ways that it continually reauthorizes itself is the way it positions readers of the Charter as

adherents to the particular set of commonsense assumptions, values and meanings it shapes and communicates. Readers are addressed or 'hailed as particular kinds of individuals or subjects' and are subsequently drawn into the philosophical or ideological position of the discourse (Edley 2001: 210). This is done through appeals to our 'duty' to, and 'respect' for, monuments and appeals to the safeguarding of monuments for 'future generations' (preamble). The legitimization of the Charter's principles is achieved through these appeals, but readers of the document are also invited to become members of the fellowship of 'good' practitioners as well. Consequently, one of the things the Charter also establishes is a sense of professional and community identity for heritage practitioners and conservationists. This process of identity construction is as powerful as the construction of national or sub-national community identities through the cultural processes played out at, or in association with, monuments and other places of 'heritage'. Subsequently this and other charters and conventions are also a monument of heritage in so far as they represent a discourse, laden with cultural and social meaning, that is continually reproduced and performed through a range of practices, and which also constructs and reinforces collective identity, cultural meaning and memory – in this case, the collective is heritage practitioners/experts. This process is masked or obscured, however, because of the extent to which the discourse is naturalized internationally by its users and understood to simply represent 'good sense'.

This process is of course a reinforcing circle. The AHD constructs and frames a charter or convention of influence and authority – in part because of the authority of the discourse of expertise used. However, the sense of the authority of both discourse and its users is continually reinforced and remade through not only the authority and status of the document in guiding policy and practice, but also in the way it establishes and maintains a community of expertise through a sense of fellowship and commitment to a set of principles. This, of course, in turn reinforces the AHD and its explanatory power as good sense. However, in this way the embedded Western narratives of national and elite historical and cultural experiences and values are propagated as authorized heritage. The practices of heritage management and conservation, which the AHD informs and frames, continually rehearse and disseminate the social and cultural values that are assumed inherent and embedded in the fabric of monuments and sites. By managing and conserving places to maintain the cultural significance and historical character, certain assumed values and historical meanings are maintained and preserved. As will be illustrated throughout the rest of this book, the way sites, monuments, landscapes and other places identified as 'heritage' are used influences the types of social or cultural meanings and experiences that are constructed, legitimized and circulated. The processes of 'management', 'conservation', 'restoration' and/or 'preservation' are particular uses of heritage places that create, legitimize and disseminate their own particular

cultural and social meanings, and are thus themselves part of, and not separate from, the 'heritage process' of meaning making. As heritage sites are managed, the performance of what is chosen to be remembered and forgotten about the past is enacted, and its conservation and presentation to the public will affect 'sense of place' and other experiences. However, this process is obscured and redefined as external to the process of heritage because of the way value is assumed as immutable and innate – management and conservation become things that are *done to* sites and places, but are not seen as organically part of the meaning-making process of heritage itself.

The above arguments may appear to rest somewhat shakily on a single, albeit canonical, text. However, the Venice Charter itself is in dialogue with other authorized and authorizing texts. Following the Venice Charter, both ICOMOS and the inter-governmental agency UNESCO have produced a plethora of charters, recommendations, guidelines and conventions, which aim to safeguard, protect, conserve or manage various aspects of the world's heritage. These texts may seek to make specific recommendations about the management of archaeological sites (ICOMOS 1990), underwater heritage (ICOMOS 1996; UNESCO 2001a), buildings, urban areas and landscapes (ICOMOS 1982, 1987, 1999a) and portable material culture (UNESCO 1970). Or they may seek to redefine or propagate specific principles, such as that of authenticity (UNESCO 1954; ICOMOS 1994) or appropriate conduct in certain circumstances (ICOMOS 1999b). The intertextuality of these texts is itself important. As Fairclough (2001: 233) note, 'any text is a link in a chain of texts, reacting to, drawing in, and transforming other texts'. The charters, conventions and similar texts from part of a genre chain, or chain of texts, that collectively reinforce and bind the authority of the AHD. Individually and collectively, they create a text of consensus – the very structure of each individual text, as with the Venice Charter, is styled around simple straightforward statements in which a number of assumptions about the nature and value of heritage are made. The content of these assumptions is transformed across the chain of texts even though each charter or convention may move between different networks of social practices. As the chain of texts interlink and propagate, their assumptions and values are given an international 'presence' and the sense of self-referential authority of conservation and management philosophy and practice is achieved. While there is insufficient space here to examine all the individual texts to illustrate the ways in which they are shaped by and reshape various aspects of the AHD as defined in Chapter 1 – the point here is that their intertextuality *is* the AHD. Individually and collectively, they represent the authorizing texts of heritage discourses. To get a deeper sense of what they do and the AHD that they espouse, I wish to turn to an examination of the practices associated with UNESCO's World Heritage Convention. This convention is a leading text in terms of influencing management practices and perceptions of heritage across the globe. It is defined as UNESCO's most successful Convention

in the cultural heritage field (Blake 2001: 72). However, it is also in the practices and strategies it establishes, in association with the development and maintenance of the World Heritage List, that we can see how the Western AHD as defined in Chapter 1 and illustrated by the Venice Charter, is played out, and the consequences it has for shaping and defining authorized 'heritage'. It is also useful to examine the World Heritage Convention because it has become a target of non-Western critiques about the nature of heritage. This critique has highlighted both the Convention's ethnocentrism and its tendency to favour elite notions of heritage values. In response, the *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* was ratified in 2003, and the dialogue between these texts will also be examined later in the chapter to analyse the extent to which the Western narratives identified in Chapter 1 as underlying the AHD have – or have not – shifted or changed.

World Heritage Convention

The UNESCO General Conference in Paris, 1972, adopted the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, or, as it is otherwise known, the World Heritage Convention. As UNESCO's website records, this convention, drafted with advice from ICOMOS, was influenced by the American practices of jointly managing and conserving natural and cultural sites. The construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, and the subsequent international campaign to salvage and save a range of cultural material from inundation and destruction, demonstrated 'the importance of solidarity and nations' shared responsibility in conserving outstanding cultural sites' and thus the potential for such a convention (UNESCO 2005).

However, the preamble also suggests that the Convention's inception originates in concerns caused by 'changing social and economic conditions' that threatened the destruction of cultural sites and that the deterioration or loss of items of 'cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world'. As Henry Cleere, formally ICOMOS World Heritage Coordinator, observes, the document is characteristic of the spirit that reigned in the 1960s (2001: 22). Certainly, a growing concern about the perceived rapid cultural and social changes represented by European post-war reconstruction, and post-war economic developments in the Western world generally, were of growing public concern during this time. That the Convention was responding in part to perceived rapidly changing social conditions, which were seen to 'aggravate the situation' of threat to cultural sites, is an important one, and will be returned to below. The World Heritage Convention, however, establishes the World Heritage List on which cultural and natural sites of 'universal' importance are listed, the first inscriptions onto the list occurring in 1978. As part of the listing process, management plans for the listed properties must be developed. Sites for listing may be nominated by State Parties to the

Convention and the World Heritage Committee assesses and determines their suitability for listing. The Committee is elected from the State Parties to the Convention, and representatives from organizations such as ICOMOS, and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) offer advice to the Committee.

Like the Venice Charter before it, the World Heritage Convention makes a range of existential assumptions about the nature of heritage, and again like the Venice Charter, the Convention unintentionally identifies a hierarchy of monuments. Although it defines three types of 'cultural heritage', they are ranked in two groups or tiers. The first tier is represented by the first two types, 'monuments' and 'groups of buildings', the second by 'sites':

> monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
>
> groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
>
> sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.
>
> (Article 1)

The first two definitions represent the 'grand' and unproblematic aspects of authorized cultural heritage. Once again, these things are perceived to have universal values and these values are assumed to lie in 'history, art or science'. Sites, on the other hand, are defined as the 'works of man [sic] or the combined works of nature and man [sic]' that may also have ethnological or anthropological value. The phrase 'works of man' is somewhat odd, as presumably monuments, buildings and so forth are all works of human beings. Why this phrase is used is revealing about the relative value placed on 'sites' as opposed to 'monuments' and 'buildings' – as sites here have to be identified as cultural through their creation by 'men'. Monuments and buildings need no explanation, they are obviously universally important and quintessentially 'cultural'. In the practice of World Heritage Listing, 'sites' tend to be those places that do not fit into the grand narratives of Western nationalism. They tend to be places of importance to communities such as Indigenous populations in post-colonial contexts where the division between

'nature and culture' is, from the point of view of post-Enlightenment Europe, less pronounced. Or they come from the European 'deep past', prior to the development of the cultural diversity that is popularly perceived to mark the culture histories that led to the formation of nation states (see Cleere 1996). Here we see a slight shift in the discourse from the Venice Charter with the inclusion of material not naturalized by the European AHD, and this inclusion needs to be explained by their explicit identification as 'man made'.

What Cleere (2001: 23) defines as the 'fundamental touchstone' of outstanding universal value is not defined in the Convention, as it is the World Heritage Committee's task to define criteria. The current criteria are:

> i. represent a masterpiece of human creative genius; or
> ii. exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design; or
> iii. bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared; or
> iv. be an outstanding example of a type of building or architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history; or
> v. be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement or land-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change; or
> vi. be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance (the Committee considers that this criterion should justify inclusion in the List only in exceptional circumstances and in conjunction with other criteria cultural or natural);
>
> (UNESCO 1997)

However, like the Convention itself, these criteria make a number of existential assumptions about, for instance, what constitutes a 'masterpiece', a 'human value' or a significant development in human history. They are necessarily vague so as to be flexible and inclusive. However, the vagueness of both these criteria and the general vagueness of the Convention, especially with regard to defining 'universal value' and 'heritage', work to create a sense that the reader assumes that they know what is meant. This both invites the reader into fellowship with the document, while the simple statements of what is of value and principle creates once again a text of consensus and

authority (Fairclough 2003). The vagueness, as Cleere (2001) reminds us, is an attempt at inclusiveness; however, the AHD and the assumptions it frames nonetheless will fill in the gaps left by any ambiguity or lack of specificity. Most of the Convention is given over to procedural matters such as the formations of committees, their powers and roles and so forth. However, what is most revealing about the AHD, and the way it functions with respect to this document, is the way the value assumptions of the AHD are applied through the listing process, as what is listed is revealing of the influence of the AHD.

In 2000, Cleere (2001: 25) analysed the distribution of the 630 sites then listed on the World Heritage List and revealed that 55 per cent of those listed were located in European countries. Asia represented 14 per cent of the listing, with most of the listed sites occurring in China and India. The Latin America/Caribbean region represented 12 per cent of the list, with Arab states representing 11 per cent, North America 5 per cent, Africa 4 per cent and Australia and Oceania 1 per cent. Five years later, this statistic has altered slightly, with European properties now representing 49 per cent of the 812 currently listed, although properties in Western countries in total represent 56 per cent of the list. Cleere (2001: 25) notes that the European imbalance is maintained by the frequency with which European countries put their heritage places forward. While Lowenthal (1998: 239) observes that Europeans 'rate their own national heritage as so superior it *ought* to be global'. However, the eurocentrisim of the listing reflects the dominance of the AHD, which frame and underpin the listing criteria. This affects the ability of certain cultures to have their sites perceived as heritage. For instance, the listing of some culturally important areas in Australia to Indigenous communities has only been able to occur due to their joint listing as natural properties. Several of the sites listed in Africa, for instance, belong to the European colonial period and are themselves colonial creations (Cleere 2001: 26). Further, the sites listed themselves tend to speak to grand narratives and European notions of aesthetic and national identity, with elitist architecture, including cathedrals, castles and palaces, being over-represented on the List (Munjeri 2004: 16). As Cleere (2001: 26) himself observes, the definition of cultural heritage employed in the World Heritage Convention was meant to be all-embracing, however:

> The process of compiling the World Heritage List has proceeded within a more restricted perception, deriving from largely European aesthetic notions relating to monumental cultures. Although most of the world's landscapes are to a considerable extent human artefacts, representing countless generations of human activity and creativity, these have for the most part been ignored, since they lack the monumental elements inseparable in the European mind from the traditional 'cultural heritage'.

This imbalance is not simply caused by disproportionate nominations by European countries, but by the AHD that frames and legitimizes the assumptions made in the listing criteria. The World Heritage List itself is a process of meaning making – it is a list that not only identifies, but also *defines*, which heritage places are globally important. The listing process creates or recreates sites as universally important and meaningful. Once again, the process of listing is an act of heritage management that is itself an act of heritage in which, on this occasion, a sense of universal 'human identity' is created. That the human identity that is performed through the List tends to be European is expressive of the degree to which the listing process is informed by, and reinforces, the European AHD.

Cleere (2001: 24) also draws our attention to criticisms levelled at the idea of 'universality', and argues that such ideas can only really be applied to the very earliest phases of human cultural development, or to the global culture of the late twentieth century. The cultural diversity of human experience, he goes on to observe, means that not only different histories will perceive different things as significant, but that cultural differences mean that not all cultures will share the same concepts of what constitutes heritage and heritage values, and that on occasion these cultural differences may be insurmountable. This concept of universality is, as Cleere (2001: 24) observes, 'deeply rooted in the European cultural tradition, combining historical and aesthetic parameters that derive from classical philosophy'. It is also deeply rooted in the processes of colonization and imperial expansion and assumptions about the cultural and technological evolutionary achievements of the West. Part of the authority of the European AHD, subsequently, lies in its own legitimizing assumptions that it *is* universally applicable and that there is, or must be, universal cultural values and expressions. The whole discourse of universality is itself a legitimizing strategy for the values and nature of heritage that underline the AHD. The discourse of universality makes a moral plea to a sense of 'brotherhood' of 'mankind' (and in this discourse the masculinity of identity is inevitably reproduced). This sort of appeal is one of the less obvious strategies of legitimization identified within Critical Discourse Analysis, but its subtlety can add to its persuasive power (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 108). Although the claims to universality within the text of the World Heritage Convention and associated guidelines, practices and debates appear to offer a straightforward description of a value that simply *is*, it is nevertheless an explicit argument about the legitimacy of European cultural narratives and values. It also becomes only natural and legitimate that both this convention and other international heritage documents 'demonstrate the importance, for all the peoples of the world' (preamble) of these cultural narratives and values.

The work the World Heritage Convention effectively (but unintentionally) does is to not only recreate heritage as universally significant, and in doing so authorize and legitimize the Western AHD within an international

context, but also create a cultural and discursive climate in which certain values and ideologies become dominant in defining cultural development and change. The opening paragraph of the preamble to the Convention states:

> *Noting* that the cultural heritage and the natural heritage are increasingly threatened with destruction not only by the traditional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic conditions which aggravate the situation with even more formidable phenomena of damage or destruction

This may read as a straightforward concern about how social and economic changes experienced in the post-war period were accelerating the physical destruction of the historic environment. However, as 'heritage', the physical manifestations of the past are valued in the Convention, and by the AHD generally, because of the values they are regarded as possessing. Here is a concern to not only save a sense of aesthetic, but implicitly also save the social and cultural values this represents. It is, as noted above, no accident that the very discourses of 'heritage' and concerns about its loss arose in a period perceived to mark major social and cultural changes, and as public debate, facilitated by increasing public access to a range of media resources, increased about environmental, political and social issues. These debates and perceived changes needed to be made sense of, understood and negotiated. Heritage as a 'mentality' (see Chapter 2) provides a point of focus through which the present and its relationship to the past can be mediated. It is a way of thinking about, acting and managing this relationship and the cultural values and meanings that flow from it. In short, heritage is an attempt to deal with, negotiate and regulate change. It is thus no accident that the World Heritage List is heavily represented by European 'universally significant places', as Europeans attempt to come to terms with the changing place of their nations in a world where the European colonial and imperial pasts (and present) are increasingly being reconsidered, and as European states redefine themselves as part of a unified Europe. The perception of a European cultural legacy to 'world civilization' is asserted and recreated through the World Heritage List as part of the renegotiation of both individual and collective European identities. Countries like Italy, Spain, Germany and France (each with 40, 38, 31 and 30 listings, respectively, as of late 2005) vie with each other to top the list of countries with most listed sites, because listing is a process in which certain national narratives and values become authorized. The competition to get places of heritage listed is part of cultural negotiations and assertions of the cultural and historical authority and legacy of these countries in a reformulated and unified Europe.

All of the above are also dissonant practices, as these negotiations both react against and respond to competing discourses, but also because it is a

process in which competing discourses become themselves regulated, if not marginalized. The discourses and narratives that may compete with each other may do so at many levels; for instance, inter-regionally between Western and Eastern discourses about the very nature of heritage and human identity, or between and within European and other Western states about the legitimacy of their historical legacy to Western or European 'civilization' and so forth. The regulation of dissonance is achieved through the listing process as nominations for inclusion on the list are moulded and framed in terms that will attempt to ensure that the places being nominated are indeed listed. That means that heritage places may be defined or redefined, and at some level recreated, in ways that will find synergy with, and meet the expectations and assumptions of, the Committee's perceptions of 'universal significance'. Subsequently in this process cultural value, memory and meaning become themselves managed, and the speed and direction of social and cultural change and dissonance become subject to management.

The sense that places of heritage are recreated through the listing process and given new and universal layers of meaning is also revealed in the use of the term 'property'. The idea of heritage 'property' is a term particularly associated with the World Heritage Convention, which uses it to define cultural heritage that has met the criteria of Article 1 (reproduced above). As heritage places move through the listing process they become World Heritage 'properties' and, as Carman (2005) argues, the idea of property assumes a right of possession – in this case it becomes possessed by the 'World'. The values become 'owned' by the world community and are subsequently further legitimized with this discourse. The term 'property' also reinforces the sense in which the cultural values associated with a place or object can be captured and frozen (Handler 2003: 363).

The above discussion has identified a range of strategies of legitimization and processes where by cultural values and narratives become the subject of management and regulation. These are established by the Convention and played out in the listing and management process; however, it is important to note that these strategies are not always successful. Certainly, UNESCO and the World Heritage Convention have been criticized for their Eurocentrism, and the emphasis that is placed on the tangibility of heritage, but the fact of this criticism means the processes identified above are resisted and contested. Importantly, UNESCO has also responded to these concerns with a range of programmes and strategies to acknowledge and deal with the concept of intangible heritage. Koïchiro Matsuura, Director General of UNESCO, states:

> While UNESCO, in accordance with its mission concerning culture and the preservation of cultural diversity, has effectively developed a powerful instrument, the 1972 World Heritage Convention, the World Heritage List nevertheless reveals a growing imbalance. The

> Tangible and monumental heritage of countries of the 'North' is more widely represented. This situation reflects a weakness in the organization's historic focus on the protection of tangible heritage, rather than intangible heritage, thereby marginalizing a vast range of cultural expressions which often belong to the countries of the 'South' and which are crucial for the map of cultural diversity. In order to truly fulfil its mission to foster cultural diversity, UNESCO is determined to safeguard both tangible and intangible heritage.
>
> (Preface to UNESCO 2001b: 2)

These UNESCO initiatives, developed to be more inclusive in the way it deals with heritage, are important for mapping the changes to the AHD identified in Chapter 1. However, before examining the UNESCO strategies to safeguard intangible heritage, I want to turn to another document that has been explicitly modified and rewritten to become more inclusive of dissonant interests. Australia ICOMOS originally wrote the *Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance* (Burra Charter) in 1979, basing it firmly on the Venice Charter, and it aimed to make its principles relevant to the Australian context. As I have suggested elsewhere (Smith 1996), this document incorporates many of the Western assumptions about the inherent value and meaning of the material or 'fabric' of heritage. However, this charter was extensively rewritten in 1999, in response to increasing pressures from Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australian communities for more active participation and consultation in the heritage management and conservation process. A detailed discourse analysis has been undertaken of this document by Waterton, myself and Campbell (2006), which I will not rehearse here. However, it is useful to summarize our arguments in the context of the current discussion as the Burra Charter, although a national document, has been both widely adopted for use in a range of European countries, but is also internationally hailed as a progressive and useful attempt at integrating community concerns and values into the management and conservation processes. While the Burra Charter is not a response to the critiques levelled at the World Heritage process, it is nonetheless a response to very similar critiques about cultural and social inclusiveness and representation. The point of reviewing the reworked Burra Charter here is to not only examine the ways in which the Western AHD has shifted, but to reveal also the problematics of that shift. The analysis will then return to the international programmes dealing with intangible heritage, and identify the light that they shed on the nature and consequences of the AHD.

Burra Charter

Like the Venice Charter, the Burra Charter has also been identified as based on 'good sense' (Domicelj 1992: 5) and is a text of consensus whereby readers

are invited or hailed as members of a community whose sense of cohesion focuses on shared principles and philosophies. As Waterton et al. (2006) argue, this text, like many other charters, once again employs a straightforward form of address around a sequence of simple authoritative statements, against which readers form a sense of fellowship or ownership with the documents underlying assumptions, principles and philosophy. The 1999 Burra Charter explicitly attempts to deal with plurality and multivocality. Australia ICOMOS, in commenting on the new charter, note on their website that it 'recognises the need to involve people in the decision-making process, particularly those that have strong associations with a place' (2005). However, the text is dialogically closed, thus reducing the ability of community perceptions of heritage and its conservation to fully engage in dialogue with the underlying philosophy of the Charter. Utilizing language which does not invite dialogue, the text becomes authoritative and reduces difference, or dialogue, between 'author' of the text and other voices completely. This is at odds with the desire of the 1999 version of the Charter to involve a range of stakeholders in the management and conservation process. The authority and philosophy of the AHD, and subsequently the practices it informs, are never really challenged by the new version of the Charter. The discourse of the new Charter does not abandon its authority, while implicitly reducing the authority of non-experts, and thus rendering values external to the AHD marginal to or reliant on expert arbitration and regulation.

Once again, this charter constructs a sense that the value and meaning of heritage is inherently physically manifested by a heritage place. A key aspect of the Charter is the concept of 'cultural significance', which is inclusively defined as 'aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations' (Article 1.2). The idea that the cultural significance of a place must determine how the place is used or managed is a defining theme of the Burra Charter. The term 'place' is one specifically adopted by the Burra Charter (both in 1999 and earlier versions) as a more inclusive term rather than 'monument', 'site' and so forth, as it implicitly recognizes the social value that heritage 'places' may have. However, the fabric defined as 'all the physical material of the place' (Article 1.3) is also all important in the Charter. How the fabric of a place is used, restored, managed and conserved is the primary focus of the document – as is indeed reasonable in a document that attempts to define 'good' management and conservation practices for tangible heritage places. However, this becomes problematic for the inclusiveness of the document as the idea of fabric assumes that cultural significance is inherently fixed within it. As Article 1.2 asserts, cultural significance is 'embodied in the place itself, its fabric, setting . . .'. As Waterton et al. (2006) argue, this works to naturalize cultural significance as a material concern, and something that becomes unproblematically the appropriate, if not sole, concern of experts in the material sciences. In addition, the Burra Charter rehearses the same legitimizing

techniques identified above in the Venice Charter. It again appeals to the moral authority of expertise through a continual appeal to not only 'respect' fabric, and the cultural significance embedded within it, but to also apply 'caution', and to 'safeguard' and 'protect' while eschewing 'distortion' and 'conjecture' in favour of objective 'evidence'. For instance:

> *Conservation* is based on a respect for the existing *fabric*, *use*, *associations* and *meanings*. It requires a cautious approach of changing as much as necessary but as little as possible.
>
> (Article 3.1, original emphasis)

> Changes to a *place* should not distort the physical or other evidence it provides, nor be based on conjecture.
>
> (Article 3.2, original emphasis)

While Article 3.1 makes explicit reference to associated meanings and respect for the current use of a place, the apparent inclusiveness of this is overshadowed by the appeals to authority and validity of professionals to prevent 'distortion' or to allow 'conjecture'. Who determines what is or is not of cultural significance, or is or is not 'conjecture', and what is or is not 'evidence' is never addressed in the Charter and is left to the judgement of the 'good sense' on which the Charter is based. This is difficult in cross-cultural situations, particularly in dealing with Indigenous Australians, where a sense of 'evidence', and indeed 'cultural significance', is entirely different and non-complementary.

Although the Charter asserts the need for community participation in conservation, interpretation and management (Article 5.1), and that 'Co-existence of cultural values should be recognised, respected and encouraged' (Article 13), this inclusiveness is problematic. As Waterton et al. (2006) point out, as there is no active sense of what community participation actually means, the Charter does not explain to what extent, or how, expertise should give ground or engage with non-expert participation. However, the relative 'place' of non-expert interests is clearly defined in the following:

> Groups and individuals with *associations* with a place as well as those involved in its management should be provided with opportunities to contribute to and participate in understanding the *cultural significance* of the place. Where appropriate they should also have opportunities to participate in its *conservation* and management.
>
> (Article 26.3, original emphasis)

Groups and individuals here are relegated to the position of passive audience. They must be given opportunities to 'understand' the cultural significance of a place, that is, they are being required to assimilate expert values. There is

simply no sense that such communication may be two-way or that the authority of expertise to make binding judgements about cultural significance is challenged. Inclusion is also to occur 'where appropriate' and, as Article 30 states, all work done at places must be undertaken under:

> Competent direction and supervision should be maintained at all stages, and any changes should be implemented by people with appropriate knowledge and skills.

The status of expertise and the consensual values established by the AHD are maintained as external to the whole heritage process of meaning making. Waterton et al. (2006) draw our attention to the observation that conservation values and responsibilities are of course another set of 'cultural values' as much as community values are. However, this point is entirely missed, not only in the Burra Charter, but in all documents of this sort. Subsequently, expertise is recreated as a technical process that does things to heritage (for its own good), and that community groups and individuals become part of the elements to be managed and dealt with in the processes of management and conservation. There is no inclusive 'partnership', but rather another set of issues, alongside issues of physical threats and economic opportunities, which must also be managed so that fabric and cultural significance is maintained. This relegation of non-expert or community values is also established by the continuous discursive use of the phrase 'the cultural significance', which reduces the plurality of cultural values and meanings to the singular and thus leaves little conceptual room for challenging the nature of significance (Waterton et al. 2006). Although the existence of community values and meaning are acknowledged throughout the Charter, they are never actually linked or associated with the all-important term 'cultural significance' – the assessment of which drives the whole management and conservation process. In addition, throughout the document central terms like cultural significance, fabric, expert practices and so forth are defined, as Waterton et al. (2006) note, unambiguously, for instance, 'cultural significance *is* . . .' while non-expert issues are described far more passively with terms such as 'may' or 'might'. The authors of the Charter are totally committed to cultural significance, but express doubt about non-expert issues. Their commitment is revealed by the modal verb 'is' – the assertion of a knowledge claim – while their doubt is revealed by 'may' and 'might', which mark a modalized statement of truth. The level of commitment expressed by both translates as a difference between 'certainty' and 'possibility'.

The authority of expertise never comes close to being challenged in the new Burra Charter. However, the philosophies and assumptions underpinning the AHD are not only uncontested and unchanged, they are actively remade and reauthorized against the concerns of community inclusion. Although it is not intended by the authors of the Charter to downplay

community participation and values, the Charter nonetheless does this simply because the AHD in which it is framed was never really identified, examined or challenged in the 1999 rewriting. Subsequently, the appeals to authority made within the AHD inevitably mean that those values and meanings that are situated outside the dominant discourse are sidelined. The discourse itself compromises inclusion, as it continually recreates and validates the dominant philosophies and assumptions. This does not mean to say that individual practitioners cannot, through their own practices, participate in equitable dialogue with community groups – but it does mean that to do so requires an *active* decision to work outside of the AHD as defined in the Charter. The very authority of the Charter as a policy and professional document makes this difficult, when the weight of professional opinion and legal practice sees this, and other similar documents, as having binding professional authority.

Effectively, what the Burra Charter does is re-establish the authority both of expertise and of the AHD itself, while defining non-expertise as an object of the technical process of management and conservation. Although attempting to deal with community issues, the document explicitly ignores the dissonant nature of heritage (Waterton et al. 2006). This is telling, as it is dissonance that is nonetheless an implicit focus of the document. Non-experts are invited to assimilate expert values on cultural significance, and thus reach accord with conservation philosophy. The regulation of non-expert value effectively becomes part of the heritage management process. Community groups and their values are 'managed' in such a way so that the social values and historical narratives – the cultural significance – attributed to heritage by the AHD is preserved and disseminated. The maintenance of these values is assured due to the prominence given in the document to fabric, and the need to 'respect' it, combined with the underlying assumption that cultural significance is innate and embodied in the fabric itself, and thus immutable.

Intangible heritage

UNESCO, despite its historical emphasis on tangible heritage, has had a long-term concern for intangible heritage. Concerns for 'folklore' have been expressed in terms of copyright concerns since the 1950s (Blake 2001: 32; Aikawa 2004). Following issues raised by a range of non-Western delegates at UNESCO sponsored meetings, and a questionnaire sent out to Member States in 1979, UNESCO initiated a sequence of measures to address the safeguarding of intangible heritage (see, for instance, Moyo and Sumaili 1985; Blake 2001: 32). However, as Aikawa (2004: 138) reports, this was often not an easy process, with various initiatives during the 1980s identified as 'premature'. In 1989, however, a General Conference adopted the Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and

Folklore unanimously. Janet Blake (2001: 33), in her report to UNESCO, which evaluated its provisions on intangible heritage, observes that this Recommendation offers a very narrow definition of folklore, while van Zanten (2004: 36) observes that it is a term that carries considerable colonial baggage. Blake notes that the Recommendation has been criticized because the view of 'safeguarding' developed in the Recommendation had been 'designed with the needs of scientific research and government officials in mind', while expertise had been privileged in the identification, dissemination and conservation process. She warns that this does not meet the aspirations of Indigenous peoples, and other producers of intangible heritage, to control their heritage, nor does it offer a process for informed consent and consultation with individuals and groups whose heritage was to be 'safeguarded' and 'revitalized' (see also van Zanten 2004).

In 1993 and 1998, respectively, UNESCO developed the Living Human Treasures Programme and the Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity. The former was proposed by the Republic of Korea and is a programme to identify, and to keep a list of, those bearers of intangible cultural skills, techniques and knowledge, and to provide opportunities for those bearers to practise their skills and knowledge and to transmit it to younger generations (UNESCO n.d.). This was the first time that skills and knowledge were placed as a focus point of preservation (Blake 2001: 45). In recognition that the World Heritage Convention was not applicable to intangible heritage, the programme of Proclaiming Masterpieces of Oral and Intangible Heritage was put in place. Since its inception, there have been three Proclamations – the first in 2001, followed by Proclamations in 2003 and 2005 – resulting in the listing of 90 Masterpieces. This programme, as Blake reports, has been criticized for the use of the term 'masterpiece', which it is argued tends to create a hierarchy of cultures (2001: 46). The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted after the 'international community decided to shift to a high gear by moving from a non-binding 'soft-law' Recommendation to a 'hard law' Convention (adopted 2003), which is binding on those States which decide to become Parties to it' (UNESCO 2003a: 3). Guidelines for the implementation of this Convention were still being developed at the time of writing of this book. However, the definition of intangible heritage offered by the new Convention (UNESCO 2003b) is:

> The practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides

> them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with exiting international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development.
>
> (Article 1)

This definition is similar to that adopted in the Proclamation Programme, which acknowledges the continuing changing nature of intangible heritage, its importance in underpinning cultural identity and the desirability of its preservation to recognize cultural diversity. Indeed, the preamble to the Convention stresses the importance of 'intangible cultural heritage as a mainspring of cultural diversity', which is under threat from the 'process of globalization and social transformation [and] the phenomenon of intolerance'. What is highly significant for the purposes of this discussion is the recognition of the possibility of cultural change and the issue of diversity. Both these mark a significant change in the discourse, as indeed does the whole issue of 'intangibility'. A significant indictor of this apparent change, and the widening of the discourse on and about heritage, is the statement in the preamble to the Convention that there is a 'deep-seated interdependence between the intangible cultural heritage and the tangible cultural and natural heritage'. This point was reinforced by the Deputy Permanent Delegate of Zimbabwe to UNESCO in 2004, Dawson Munjeri, when he observed that 'cultural heritage should speak through the values that people give it and not the other way round . . . the tangible can only be understood and interpreted through the intangible' (2004: 13). These statements suggest the possibility of extending the definition of heritage not only beyond the monumental, but also challenge the dominant assumptions about the inherent nature of the value and meaning of tangible heritage.

While these developments represent an apparent shift in the AHD, but this has not been accomplished without considerable opposition. The extent to which this shift has actually occurred is also hard to gauge, as the 2003 Convention has yet to become operational. However, the criticism and debate over the Proclamations of Masterpieces and the Convention itself reveal both the resistance of the AHD to change, but importantly some of the assumptions and cultural work that has done, and continues to be done, in preserving and disseminating certain perceptions, experiences and ideologies. This discussion will centre on three issues raised by the Convention and the Proclamation Programme.

The first issue is that of the applicability of Intangible heritage. While 120 Member States voted for the Convention, there were abstentions – notably Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the United

States (Kurin 2004: 66). Some Western countries have objected to the relevance of the document – one official in a leading government heritage organization in the United Kingdom having asserted the irrelevance of the Convention as the 'UK has no intangible heritage'.[1] Certainly, as noted in Chapter 2, the absence of most Western countries as State Parties to the Convention is telling. For the governments of countries where issues of multiculturalism and the rights of Indigenous inhabitants are contested, the possibility of drawing international attention and kudos to minority cultural achievements is certainly politically problematic. However, the issue also relates to the inability of intangible heritage to 'speak to' or find synergy with the dominant sense of historical and social experiences that underline the Western AHD. The emphasis on materiality, and the experiences it represents, is fundamentally different from a sense of heritage as oral tradition, skills and knowledge – simply because the sense of audience for these performances is so very different. Underlying the notion of monumentality is the idea of its universal applicability, that it has a universal audience. Embedded in the idea of the monumentality of heritage lies the ideology and perceptions of cultural evolution, wherein monuments are identified as representing, or more to the point as 'being', the pinnacle of cultural achievement. This, by its own logic, must be universally relevant and applicable, and is a performance of heritage that is intended to speak to and influence the cultural and social perspectives of a wide audience. Intangible heritage, such as oral histories and traditions, tend to address much smaller audiences as intimate performances of cultural continuity and identity creation.

The Convention and Proclamation Programme are dedicated to recognizing and celebrating cultural diversity. This is the second issue that requires examination, as this appears to represent a marked shift from the Venice Charter, World Heritage Convention and similar documents with their emphasis on universal values. Although the 1989 Recommendation stressed the idea that folklore is part of the 'universal heritage' (preamble), and the Masterpiece programme (UNESCO 2001c) also tends to underscore its identification of eligible material as universally applicable – the discourse of 'masterpiece' itself recalling the discourse of monumentality – this stress has shifted in the Convention which explicitly celebrates 'diversity'. As Blake (2001: 12) observes, there is a conceptual difficulty in valuing intangible heritage as 'universal heritage', and that this has underscored the conceptual problems faced by UNESCO in developing its various programmes for safeguarding intangible heritage. Blake notes that in keeping with UNESCO's universalist task any instrument that UNESCO develops to protect intangible heritage should employ the notion of universality (2001). She notes that:

> It is advisable to make reference to intangible heritage as a 'universal heritage of humanity' in the Preamble as a justification for protection

> but to avoid its use within the definition itself. In this way the specific value that this heritage has for the community is safeguarded while the need for its international protection of the grounds of preserving cultural diversity is underlined.
>
> (Blake 2001: 12)

Blake was concerned about avoiding legal contradictions in the way UNESCO's conventions are constructed, and goes on to explain that issues of universality should not occur within the actual convention definitions, as such a move may be seen by Indigenous groups as an attempt at cultural appropriation and colonization of their heritage (2001: 13). However, what is important is that the issue of universality is conceived as an important legal and moral ideology for protection. While it is interesting that this term does not subsequently appear in the preamble or anywhere else in the Convention, Blake's concerns identify the persuasive power of that discourse up, at least, to that point. The conceptual difficulty that Blake identifies, however, does not lie in how intangible heritage is conceived, but in the legacy of colonial and imperial experiences and cultural evolutionary assumptions that underly the Western AHD. The issue is not whether intangible heritage is universal, but where tangible heritage is. The assumption of universality denies the possibility of dissonance. There is no site on the World Heritage List that will be seen to be valuable to all cultures – or even to all people within the state in which the 'world heritage' site may exist. The ability, as Lowenthal (1998: 227) argues, for heritage to be all things to all people is simply absurd. Any item of heritage will represent different experiences to different individuals and groups. For instance, any World Heritage Listed cathedral may be valued for its architectural and aesthetic achievements by some, its religious values by others, disregarded for its religious values by others, seen as a site of historical and continuing social oppression by others – but it is not representative of universal experiences and beliefs. It, like intangible heritage, speaks to particular and limited audiences. This may seem an obvious point, but it is one that is glossed over in assumptions about universal values, that relegate dissonance to being an extraordinary event rather than an integral element of heritage. Moreover, although there appears to have been a shift in the discourse, it remains to be seen whether the lack of 'universal' applicability of intangible heritage will continue to result in its international marginalization. Certainly, there appears to be a differential power or sense of gravity applied to tangible as opposed to intangible heritage. This is illustrated in the discourse of Matsuura's announcement that:

> Culture no longer solely inhabits the proud temple that European civilizations had raised up to it: theatres, operas, museums and libraries. Throughout the world, it has moved into cities and countryside, descending into the streets, pervading the forests and fields,

> endorsing traditions, customs and know-how, encompassing oral tradition as well as the written word in expression of the memory and of creativity, drawing together the functional object and the work of art, and relativizing the distances that used to lie between actual experience and creation.
>
> (Director-General of UNESCO in UNESCO 2003a: 1)

This statement prefaces a document of cultural diversity that discusses both the World Heritage Convention and the new Convention dealing with intangible heritage. The image is arresting: 'culture', like some creeping fescue, can 'descend' from the high cultural achievements of Europe to the more modest achievements of 'the streets'. Europe has recognized the cultural achievements of the rest of the world and anointed them as 'legitimate'. Perhaps this is just an unfortunate turn of phrase from the Director General; however, the power relations of the Western AHD with other conceptualizations of heritage revealed by this statement cannot be ignored. UNESCO is, as Blake (2001) noted, a universalizing project. It is also a project of legitimization – of recognizing and giving authority to certain expressions of culture and heritage. How something is recognized can be as important as the very act of its recognition. In the above passage, Europe does clearly 'endorse' as the 'distances' between functionality and aesthetics are relativized, and the suggestion is that the power of the European AHD has not really been challenged.

The third issue that needs to be examined is that of cultural change. As argued in Chapter 2, the idea of cultural change and the mutability of cultural values and meanings are anathema in the AHD. However, the concept of change lies at the heart of definitions of intangible heritage. The term 'living culture' is often employed in UNESCO documents and in the debate more widely about intangible heritage. It has been observed that the term 'living culture has the advantage to refer immediately to the people practising it. Furthermore, it is to be distinguished from "dead" cultural artefacts' (van Zanten 2004: 28–9). The use of the concept living culture throws into sharp relief the idea of the immutability of value and meaning given to tangible – or dead – heritage. Several commentators have expressed concern about the logic of UNESCO's programme of Proclaiming Masterpieces. One of the criteria for listing Masterpieces on a list designed in part to 'protect' them is their vitality. This is contradictory, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2004: 56) points out, as a thing of vitality hardly needs safeguarding (see also Nas 2002: 143; Kurin 2004). Others have noted that creating lists and measures to safeguard intangible heritage will inevitably result in the 'freezing' or fossilization of cultural change (Sears 2002: 147; Amselle 2004; van Zanten 2004: 41). These concerns highlight some of the underpinning assumptions of the AHD: firstly, that management and protection is indeed about, and should be about, fossilization; and, secondly, that the inherent values of

tangible heritage are immutable. As with the issue of 'universality', the concern about fossilization needs to be reversed and the question asked, is tangible heritage really inert and static? Of course it is not static. As Munjeri (2004) observes, heritage only becomes recognizable when it expresses the values of a society; the values associated with objects are intangible and it is only through these values that heritage can be both recognized and known. Subsequently, what the debate about intangible heritage as living culture also throws into relief is the idea that the listing process, either of tangible or intangible heritage, is itself a performance of meaning making. For any item or event of heritage to be listed as either a 'masterpiece' or as a 'world heritage' site its cultural values must, by definition, be pronounced and vital. While the list may be aimed at protection, what it does first and foremost is proclaim the cultural values and meanings that are given authority and legitimacy. Protection is then afforded through the authority given to those values – but what lies at the heart of the sense of 'protection' is the preservation of the legitimacy of certain cultural values, historical and social experiences and understandings about the world.

Several commentators have noted that the Proclamation Programme has tended to list the colourful and the exotic, those things that the West tends to romanticize, while there has also been a tendency to represent nationally-valued movements or events so that Indigenous and minority works are under-represented (Kurin 2002, 2004; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2004: 57) also makes the point that in creating a list separate from the World Heritage List both the Convention and the Proclamation Programme have created an intangible heritage programme that is equally as exclusive. She notes that neither the Bolshoi Ballet nor the Metropolitan Opera are likely to be nominated for the intangible list, but that Nôgaku, a Japanese theatre form already protected in Japan, is. She goes on to observe that:

> By admitting cultural forms associated with royal courts and state-sponsored temples, as long as they are not European, the intangible heritage list preserves the division between the West and the rest and produces a phantom list of intangible heritage, a list of that which is not indigenous, not minority, and not non-Western, though no less intangible.
>
> (2004: 57)

Of concern here, is the degree to which the AHD has been able to shift sufficiently enough to relinquish its role in creating and recreating the Western worldview of both itself and the 'other'. It is relatively early days in the implementation of international intangible heritage management programmes, and although there is some shift in the AHD there is nonetheless evidence that this shift has not substantially recast the gaze or mentality

through which heritage is defined and understood. The power of the Western AHD does not appear to have been greatly affected, and indeed, if Kirshenblatt-Gimblett is correct, it has not been challenged at all, and the work that it does in asserting and preserving cultural meaning through institutions like UNESCO and ICOMOS seems assured, at least for the moment.

Conclusion

The various conventions, charters, recommendations and other texts enacted by UNESCO and ICOMOS, as authorizing institutions of heritage, play a role in the maintenance of the authority of heritage discourses. They represent a dominant form of discourse, and one that tends to privilege European, and more generally Western, assumptions about the meaning and nature of heritage. The persuasive power of the Western AHD, which frames and legitimizes the various programmes and texts discussed above, is continually reasserted and legitimized both in and by these documents and the practices they guide. A community of heritage practitioners and conservationists is created by these documents, their identity defined by their respect for and commitment to a set of principles and underlying philosophies. In short, these documents are part of the process of heritage in that they identify and create meaning and identity. This is done in terms of creating a community of practitioners and expertise, but also in terms of creating a sense of 'world' or 'national' identities.

The analysis of the Venice Charter drew attention to the ability of the AHD to create a sense of heritage conservation and management as something that is done *to* heritage and not part of the heritage performance itself. Heritage management and conservation is established as a technical process in which expertise and objectivity are valued and privileged. This then obscures the cultural and political work that the management and conservation process does in itself, creating and recreating heritage and the intangible meanings and values they may represent and legitimize. The World Heritage Convention is revealed as processes in which certain values and cultural meanings, which often speak to or represent European and Western narratives and experiences of nation and class, are authorized, safeguarded and broadcast. It is also a process in which dissonance and difference is regulated, arbitrated and managed.

In the analysis of both the Burra Charter and the international programmes for safeguarding and protecting intangible heritage, the power of the AHD and its resistance to change was identified. This resistance revealed integral aspects of the AHD, but also illustrated that changes to heritage management practices, when they do occur, are continually redefined and controlled with reference to the authority of the existing discourse. This does not mean that the AHD is static and unchanging, but that change when it does occur does not necessarily abandon the underlying philosophies and

ideologies buried in the discourse, and that these can, and often do, retard or hinder the progress of change to heritage practices. What this means, however, is that for effective change to be initiated an explicit and critical recognition of the cultural and political nature and consequences of the AHD does need to be made. Only from such a point of recognition can effective changes to the discourse, its underlying ideology and the practices it frames and directs, be implemented.